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This article addresses four fundamental questions:
1. If joint ventures and, particularly, metal-neutral joint ven-
tures produce significant benefits for consumers, then
why not grant them antitrust immunity while subjecting
them to periodic reviews that ensure benefits continue to
materialize and exceed the potential costs of lessening
competition?
2. Alternatively, why not grant antitrust immunity to a joint
venture with a time limit and subject it to another review
on whether the immunity should be extended for another
fixed period of time?
3. Or, why not attach conditions other than carve-outs to any
immunized joint ventures?
4. Finally, should immunity have been granted in the first
place?
In granting immunity, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) and its counterparts in other countries faced the classic
type I and type II errors in decision-making.1 By not granting
immunity, the DOT risked preventing joint ventures that might
have net positive effects for consumers—a type II error.2 On the
other hand, when granting immunity, the DOT risked approv-
ing joint ventures that might have net negative effects—a type I
error.3 Which error is more critical, and more likely? Antitrust
immunity never made sense, even for so-called public policy
* Associate Professor of Economics at York University’s Schulich School of
Business in Toronto, Canada.
1 Philip D. Olson, Notes: Decision Making Type I and Type II Error Analysis, 20 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 81 (1997).
2 Id. at 82.
3 Id.
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purposes. Alliances did not spare major U.S. airlines from bank-
ruptcy. There were frequent “open skies” agreements even with-
out antitrust immunity.
It is unlikely that the joint ventures’ efficiency benefits and
antitrust immunity goal to encourage metal-neutrality have ma-
terialized. The regulators never thought about integration
problems, competing goals, and different corporate cultures.
Hence, it is unlikely that joint ventures’ efficiency benefits
counteracted anticompetitive effects.
In examining the potential anticompetitive impacts, the regu-
lators did not fully appreciate the potential for restrictive trade
practices—such as market foreclosure, switching costs, and ac-
cess to hubs (e.g., slots, gates, check-in counters)—and the pos-
sibility of lessening competition in markets beyond countries or
continents covered by the immunity. The European Commis-
sion (EC) and the DOT did note the potential for market fore-
closure. Even though they acknowledged this possibility, market
foreclosure did not influence their decisions because there was
no evidence at the time of the proposed joint venture causing
market foreclosure.4 Evidence became available years after the
opportunity to observe joint ventures’ operations and competi-
tive behavior. Time limits for antitrust immunity and periodic
reviews are thus warranted.
Therefore, governments should administer mandatory inter-
lining, open access to frequent flyer programs, and time limits
on antitrust immunity. While these recommendations do not
guarantee flourishing competition in many international mar-
kets, they are critical for creating equal opportunity.
I. INTRODUCTION
NORTHWEST AIRLINES (NORTHWEST) and KLM RoyalDutch Airlines (KLM) made the first request to the DOT
for antitrust immunity (ATI) in 1992.5 The DOT granted immu-
nity on January 11, 1993.6 Subsequently, the Northwest-KLM alli-
4 Michael Gremminger, The Commission’s Approach Towards Global Airline Alli-
ances—Some Evolving Assessment Principles, 1 EC COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. 75, 78
(2003).
5 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, Docket OST-95-579-1 (Sept. 9, 1992).
6 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Final Order, Joint Application of Northwest Airlines,
Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Docket OST-95-579-34 (Jan. 11, 1993).
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ance expanded.7 There are now twelve active immunized
alliances administered by the Secretary of Transportation in the
United States8:
1. America–LAN–Lan Peru: “The Final Order imposed
carve outs for U.S. point-of-sale traffic affecting time sensi-
tive travelers” between Miami and Lima, and Miami and
Santiago.9
2. Oneworld Transatlantic—American Airlines, British Air-
ways, Iberia, Lı´neas Ae´reas de Espan˜a, S.A., Finnair, and
Royal Jordanian Airlines: “The authority was granted sub-
ject to a slot remedy.”10
3. American Airlines and Japan Airlines.11
4. SkyTeam II—Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, KLM/
Air France, Alitalia, and Czech Airlines.12
5. Delta–Virgin Blue Group.13
6. Delta–Aeromexico: The authority was granted subject to
the transfer of twenty-four slot-pairs for service between
the U.S. and Mexico City; antitrust immunity expires after
five years.14
7. United–Air New Zealand: “The alliance is subject to carve
outs for all U.S. point-of-sale time-sensitive passengers in
7 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Show Cause Order, Joint Application of Alitalia-Com-
pagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A., Czech Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Inc., KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Inc, and Socie´te´ Air France, Docket OST-
2007-28644 (May 19, 2009).
8 There are also four other immunized joint ventures, which do not involve
U.S. carriers: Lufthansa and Singapore Airlines; Japan Airlines, British Airways,
and Finnair—linking Japan and Europe; Lufthansa and All Nippon Airways
(ANA); and Air Asia and ANA—linking Japan and India. See Jenny Southan, Air-
line Joint Ventures: Marriage of Convenience, BUS. TRAVELER (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
www.businesstraveller.com/features/airline-joint-ventures-marriage-convenience/
[https://perma.cc/FB9Y-FTLA].
9 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AIRLINE ALLIANCES OPERATING WITH ANTITRUST IMMU-
NITY 4 (2014), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/140507
%20-%20All%20Immunized%20Alliances.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK9J-AUTH].
Docket OST-2016-0087 is currently pending to extend the immunity to cover the
entire LATAM Airlines Group. Id. at 6.
10 Id. at 5. “For a period of [ten] years from the date of approval, applicants
must transfer four slot pairs at London Heathrow to competitors: [two] for
Heathrow-Boston services and [two] for services between Heathrow and any U.S.
city.” Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id. at 7–8.
14 Id. at 8.
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10. Star Alliance—United, Brussels, Lufthansa, Air Canada,




Under 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b), the DOT may exempt airlines
from the antitrust laws to allow a proposed transaction to pro-
ceed.21 The DOT’s review of international alliance agreements
considers competitive and public interests:
The DOT’s review of international alliance agreements has two
steps. The DOT first determines whether an agreement “substan-
tially reduces or eliminates competition.” The DOT applies the
principles contained in the antitrust agencies’ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and uses the Clayton Act test, which “requires [con-
sidering] whether the Alliance Agreements are likely to substan-
tially reduce competition and facilitate the exercise of market
power” in relevant markets. If the DOT determines that an agree-
ment is anticompetitive, then [it must not grant ATI to the joint
venture,] unless the DOT finds that the agreement “is necessary
to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important
public benefits” and there is no less-anti competitive alternative.
If the DOT approves an anticompetitive agreement on those
grounds, then it must exempt [the agreement] from the antitrust
laws.22
But why is antitrust immunity even necessary? Can the DOT al-
low alliance members to cooperate however they want and mon-
15 Id. at 10–11.
16 Id. at 11.
17 Id. at 12.
18 Id. at 13. British Midland International ceased operations in 2012. Id. at 12.
In an earlier United–Lufthansa case, “[t]he alliance [was] subject to carve outs
for U.S. point-of-sale nonstop O&D traffic in the Chicago-Frankfurt and Washing-
ton-Frankfurt markets.” Id. at 10. Similarly, in an earlier United–Air Canada case,
this “alliance was subject to carve outs for all U.S. point-of-sale local O&D traffic
in the Chicago-Toronto and San Francisco-Toronto markets.” Id.
19 Id. at 13.
20 Id.
21 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (2018).
22 William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Ven-
ture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 443,
447–48 (2012); see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2017).
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itor their behavior ex post to ensure that they do not violate the
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, or the Federal Trade Commission
Act provisions—the triumvirate of U.S. antitrust laws?
The answer partly lies in the per se rule for § 1 of the Sher-
man Act. As noted on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
website:
The Sherman Act outlaws “every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade,” and any “monopolization, at-
tempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to
monopolize.” Long ago, the Supreme Court decided that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit every restraint of trade, only those
that are unreasonable. . . . [C]ertain acts are considered so harm-
ful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These in-
clude plain arrangements among competing individuals or
businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids. These acts are
“per se” violations of the Sherman Act; in other words, no defense
or justification is allowed.23
Furthermore, the penalties can be quite severe:
Although most enforcement actions are civil, the Sherman Act is
also a criminal law, and individuals and businesses that violate it
may be prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Criminal prose-
cutions are typically limited to intentional and clear violations
such as when competitors fix prices or rig bids. The Sherman Act
imposes criminal penalties of up to $100 million for a corpora-
tion and $1 million for an individual, along with up to 10 years in
prison. Under federal law, the maximum fine may be increased
to twice the amount the conspirators gained from the illegal acts
or twice the money lost by the victims of the crime, if either of
those amounts is over $100 million.24
According to the FTC, price fixing goes beyond agreements to
set prices, including “shipping fees, warranties, discount pro-
grams, or financing rates.”25 Antitrust scrutiny and a per se viola-
tion can cover competitors discussing any of the following:
capacity, identity of customers, allocation of customers or sales
areas, production quotas, or terms of condition of sales.26
23 The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/
WU9Q-L5EM] (emphasis in original).
24 Id.
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Thus, without ATI, the alliances would not be able to proceed
with any explicit or tacit cooperation. Neither the European
Union (Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union) nor Canada (Competition Act) have simi-
lar per se prohibitions on price fixing.27 Price fixing is illegal in
both the European Union and Canada, but this behavior is sub-
ject to investigation, for there might be some positive benefits
for consumers.
There were other reasons the DOT was willing to grant ATI.
The DOT saw this as an incentive for countries to enter into
open skies agreements with the United States.28 Indeed, the
DOT claimed that an open skies agreement was a necessary con-
dition for granting ATI to an alliance.29 In addition, the DOT
believed that immunized alliances—particularly, metal-neutral
joint ventures (JV)—would encourage airlines to cooperate fully
and thus permit them to maximize the theoretical benefits for
consumers.30 According to an EC-U.S. report:
Integrated JVs give members of alliances the strongest incentives
to cooperate on sales and pricing, because the individual carriers
no longer seek to maximise their own revenue, but rather the
revenue of the network. A key component of an agreement de-
signed to achieve “metal-neutrality” is fare combinability, in
which the customers are able to view fares for different segments
and combine them easily into a single itinerary.31
Alliances developed as a way to circumvent foreign ownership
limits32 and cabotage restrictions33 while enhancing the alli-
27 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 101–02, March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; see
also Competition Act, 1985 R.S.C., c C-34, §§ 90(2)(e)–(f), 93(f)–(g) (Can.)
[hereinafter Competition Act].
28 See The Republic of Korea, Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alliances 2 (Int’l Civil
Aviation Org., Working Paper No. 85, 2013), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/at
conf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp85_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MLZ9-5JDM] [hereinafter Air Transport Conference].
29 See id. Obviously, the DOT no longer believes this to be a requirement since
it approved the Delta–Aeromexico JV and the United States and Mexico do not
have an open skies agreement. AIRLINE ALLIANCES OPERATING WITH ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY, supra note 9, at 8.
30 EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES:
COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 7–8 (2010), http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/joint_alliance_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LAH4-EVV3] [hereinafter TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES].
31 Id. at 22.
32 The United States, like most other countries, has foreign ownership restric-
tions on U.S. airlines. Airline Ownership and Control Rules: At Once Both Irrelevant
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ances’ competitive positions.34 Without ATI in the United States,
the potential benefits for U.S. airlines entering into a joint ven-
ture with other members of an alliance might be limited. Never-
theless, there were some benefits for U.S. airlines in joining an
alliance.
This article thus addresses four different questions:
1. If alliances and, particularly, metal-neutral joint ventures
produce significant benefits for consumers, then why not
grant them ATI subject to periodic reviews to ensure that
the benefits do materialize and continue to exceed the
potential costs of lessening competition, where lessening
competition extends beyond § 7 of the Clayton Act and
includes § 2 of the Sherman Act?
2. Alternatively, why not grant ATI to a joint venture with a
time limit (e.g., a five-year limit as in the
Delta–Aeromexico case), subject to another review to de-
termine whether the ATI should be extended for another
fixed period of time?
3. Or, why not attach conditions other than carve outs to any
ATI?35
4. Finally, should ATI have been granted in the first place?
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL BENEFITS
With regard to questions one and two, the common argument
against imposing any time limits on ATI is that this likely would
deter the airlines proposing a joint venture from integrating
their operations for fear that they might have to incur substan-
tial costs at a later date to dismantle the joint venture. The FTC
states, “The premerger notification requirements of the
Hart–Scott–Rodino Act allow the antitrust agencies to examine
the likely effects of proposed mergers before they take place.
This advance notice avoids the difficult and potentially ineffec-
and Enduring, CAPA: CENTRE FOR AVIATION (June 4, 2017), https://centreforavia
tion.com/analysis/resports/airline-ownership-and-control-rules-at-once-both-ir
relevant-and-enduring-345816 [https://perma.cc/C2HL-BY7G].
33 In air service agreements, airlines (e.g., non-U.S. airlines) are not allowed to
carry domestic O&D passengers between two cities in a foreign market (e.g., any
two cities in the United States). Cabotage and Aviation Rules Relating to Cabotage on
International Flights, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N, https://www.aopa.org/
travel/international-travel/cabotage [http://perma.cc/864C-2C6U].
34 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 13, 23.
35 Consent agreements are quite common as part of the approval process for
mergers in the United States.
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tive ‘unscrambling of the eggs’ once an anticompetitive merger
has been completed.”36 The Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) has pointed out: “far-reach-
ing joint ventures[ ] are deemed more likely to achieve merger-
like synergies and efficiencies. At the same time, they may re-
quire substantial investments by the allied airlines to implement
the foreseen level of integration, and integration can be difficult
to adjust or unwind if needed.”37
Since integration in a joint venture generates benefits for con-
sumers, the deterrent effect could have greatly limited the po-
tential benefits and diminished the value of ATI. However, the
FTC and Department of Justice established precedent in investi-
gating completed mergers that later harmed customers.38 Fur-
thermore, if the airlines proposing a joint venture truly believed
that ATI and the subsequent investments in creating metal-neu-
tral operations would generate net benefits for consumers, then
why should they worry about time limits and future reviews? The
only uncertainty emanates from the possibility that the joint ven-
ture would not produce net benefits. This would be discovered
in a future review that measures rather than hypothesizes the
efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, it is neces-
sary to examine the benefits, including broader public interest
benefits, which joint ventures among airlines in an alliance
should produce to counter criticism to imposing any limits on
ATI.
Joint ventures among airlines are analogous to a merger, es-
pecially since there are foreign ownership restrictions in the air-
line industry.39 Hence, for joint venture agreements to be
approved by the authorities responsible for enforcing the anti-
trust laws, like mergers, they must generate efficiencies and cost
savings to offset the anticompetitive effects. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act forbids mergers and acquisitions that may be harm-
ful to “competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”40 But as the
FTC has pointed out on its website:
36 Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers [https://perma.cc/ZS22-JZT8].
37 Org. Econ. Cooperation & Devel., AIRLINE COMPETITION 11 (June 12, 2014),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF
/COMP(2014)14&docLanguage=EN [https://perma.cc/9R3J-68H7].
38 Mergers, supra note 36.
39 See TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 7–8, 13.
40 Mergers, supra note 36.
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Many mergers produce savings by allowing the merged firms to
reduce costs, eliminate duplicate functions, or achieve scale
economies. Firms will often pass merger-specific benefits on to
consumers in the form of lower prices, better products, or more
choices. The agencies [FTC and Department of Justice] are un-
likely to challenge mergers when the efficiencies of the merger
prevent any potential harm that might otherwise arise from the
proposed merger. Theoretical cost savings would not be enough,
however; they must be demonstrated. And the efficiencies must
involve a genuine increase in productivity. It is not enough for
cost savings to result merely from a reduction in output, or from
the assertion of newfound market power against suppliers. The
price reductions should result from real efficiencies in the
merger and not from reducing output or service.41
The key statement is, “[t]heoretical cost savings would not be
enough, however; they must be demonstrated.”42 Since it is un-
likely that a proposed joint venture could demonstrate any up-
41 Entry and Efficiencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/entry-efficiencies [https://
perma.cc/KW88-FPVY]. The balance between anticompetitive effects and effi-
ciencies is common in the competition laws of other countries. For example,
under Canada’s Competition Act, among the factors to be considered in both
mergers (§ 92) or agreements (§ 90) are the following: “the extent to which ef-
fective competition remains or would remain in the market” and removal of an
effective competitor, or likelihood that a merger or agreement “would result in
the removal of such a competitor.” Competition Act, supra note 27,
§§ 90(2)(e)–(f), 93(f)–(g). Section 90(4) sets out the efficiency exemption for
agreements or arrangements:
The Tribunal shall not make an order under subsection (1) if it
finds that the agreement or arrangement has brought about or is
likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than,
and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of compe-
tition that will result or is likely to result from the agreement or
arrangement, and that the gains in efficiency would not have been
attained if the order had been made or would not likely be attained
if the order were made.
Id. at § 90(4). Section 96(1) does the same for mergers:
The Tribunal shall not make an order under section 92 if it finds
that the merger or proposed merger in respect of which the appli-
cation is made has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in
efficiency that will be greater than, and will offset, the effects of any
prevention or lessening of competition that will result or is likely to
result from the merger or proposed merger and that the gains in
efficiency would not likely be attained if the order were made.
Id. at § 96(1).
42 Entry and Efficiencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/entry-efficiencies [https://
perma.cc/KW88-FPVY].
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front efficiencies, this should support the argument favoring pe-
riodic reviews of an ATI grant. Such reviews would examine
whether theoretical cost savings materialized and, if so, the mag-
nitude of these savings. Without ex post periodic reviews, the en-
tire exercise is theoretical and abstract.
What are the possible efficiency gains from an airline alli-
ance? The EC and the DOT have suggested:
Global alliances allow airlines to link their networks of routes and
sell tickets on the flights of their commercial partners, thereby
offering travellers access to hundreds of destinations around the
world on a single virtual network. Airlines participating in an alli-
ance aim to provide value to consumers by creating a compre-
hensive route network, more convenient and better coordinated
schedules, single on-line prices, single point check-in, coordi-
nated service and product standards, reciprocal frequent flyer
programs, and service upgrade potential.43
As an example, authors Dean and Shane indicated that, in
granting ATI to the expanded Star alliance in 2009, the DOT
concluded:
[T]he alliance would produce “numerous public benefits,”
including
• an expanded network serving many new cities;
• new online service, including both new routes and ex-
panded capacity on existing routes;
• enhanced service options such as more routings, reduced
travel times, expanded nonstop service in selected markets,
new fare products, and integrated corporate contracting and
travel agency incentives;
• enhanced competition due to the addition of a major new
gateway, the elimination of multiple markups on code-share
segments, and more vigorous competition between alliances;
• cost efficiencies;
• strengthened financial positions for the participating carri-
ers; and
• substantial economic benefits to communities.44
The EC and the DOT added additional benefits:
Lower costs and increased capacity through increased density[:]
. . . Perhaps one of the most fundamental potential benefits from
consolidation or cooperation arises from economies of scale, or
43 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 8.
44 Warren L. Dean, Jr. & Jeffrey N. Shane, Alliances, Immunity, and the Future of
Aviation, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 19 (2010).
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lower per-unit costs from an increased level of output. By partici-
pating in an alliance, airlines can enjoy lower per-passenger costs
when they increase the number of passengers carried on their
existing network, a phenomenon known as economies of density.
When two airlines cooperate, by joining their respective feeder
flows, the alliance may serve a larger pool of customers and can
realise cost savings by carrying additional passengers over trunk
routes.45
The DOT continues to believe that immunized joint ventures,
particularly metal-neutral joint ventures, encourage airlines to
fully cooperate and thus permit them to maximize the “theoreti-
cal” benefits for consumers.46 But the airlines in a joint venture
would have an even greater incentive to generate efficiencies
and pass on some of the benefits to consumers if the joint ven-
ture is reviewed periodically. They must actually produce the
benefits, rather than claim ex ante that benefits would material-
ize to extend ATI.
On the other hand, almost twenty years ago, Joos Stragier,
who was then the Deputy Head of Directorate-General (DG) for
Competition in the EC, pointed out the potential anticompeti-
tive effects of alliances:
45 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 21. Star Alliance, as well
as the other global alliances, have emphasized the following advantages, most of
them repeating the views of the DOT:
Customer Benefits:
Customers enrolled in any of the Star Alliance member airlines’
frequent flyer programmes (FFP) can collect and redeem miles,
kilometres or points on any member carrier. Accrued mileage
counts towards higher status in the customer’s selected FFP and
can also be redeemed for a one cabin upgrade on any of the mem-
ber airlines.
. . . .
Convenient schedules[:]
By providing convenient arrival and departure times, Star Alliance
member airlines have optimised connections within the network,
thereby connecting times for passengers.
Seamless Travel[:]
Through check-in, joint ticketing, check-in and baggage facilities,
co-location and connection teams at key airports—these all play a
role in creating a smoother travel experience. Star Alliance Gold
customers can now also make use of the dedicated Gold Track se-
curity checks at many airports across the globe.
Star Alliance—The Way the Earth Connects, STAR ALLIANCE, https://
www.staralliance.com/documents/20184/680657/General%2BStar%2BBack
grounder/0e31a9c3-2a75-4091-b1ae-8324db1997d7 [https://perma.cc/2PQV-
D8TZ] (last updated June 30, 2017).
46 See TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 7–8.
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Airline alliances therefore raise fundamental questions about
their effect on competition in air services. . . .
In particular, an alliance can significantly reduce competition
on overlapping non-stop routes and overlapping connecting
routes where the allied airlines were once main competitors.
Even where the two networks do not overlap in the markets they
serve, the alliance can have serious anti-competitive effects by re-
ducing or eliminating competition on the hub-to-hub route(s)
between the networks. Moreover, alliances between airlines oper-
ating hub-and-spoke networks will normally enhance demand for
the network as a whole and increase the market power of the
network, especially at its hub airports. This entails the risk of ren-
dering still more difficult new entry into the network’s markets to
the detriment of both international and domestic competition.47
While not explicitly stated, it appears that Stragier saw the po-
tential for market foreclosure by alliances, especially if non-alli-
ance airlines were precluded from attracting feed traffic at
hubs.48 Fifteen years later, the OECD emphasized these same
concerns, and explicitly acknowledged the possibility of market
foreclosure:
A secondary concern in international markets is restricted access
to domestic feed traffic for non-allied carriers at hub airports
dominated by alliance partners (referred to as “vertical” effects).
If allied carriers can effectively foreclose access to feeder traffic
to other non-allied competitors at their hubs, then the viability of
competitors’ operations on international routes from those hubs
may be reduced.49
While the DOT and other countries’ competition authorities ac-
knowledge that joint ventures lessen competition in many city-
pair markets, they expected the benefits of the postulated effi-
ciencies to exceed the costs (i.e. higher fares) of lessening
competition.50
Even if the efficiencies and cost savings of a joint venture did
not exceed the costs of lessening competition, the DOT would
47 Joos Stragier, Current Issues Arising with Airline Alliances, EURO. AIR L. ASS’N
42, 42–43 (Nov. 5, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/
sp1999678_en.html [https://perma.cc/FW5Q-V84M].
48 See id. at 41–42, 44–45.
49 Int’l Transp. Forum, Air Service Agreement Liberalisation and Airline Alliances,
ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEVEL. 1, 47 (2014), https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/
default/files/docs/14airserviceagreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CL8-TM7Z].
50 Natalia Nunes et al., The Economic Impact of Airline Alliances, PRODUCTIVITY
COMM’N 1, 46 (May 29, 1997), https://www.pc.gov.au/research/supporting/air
line-alliances/aircraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS9J-H3F3].
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argue that there were “public interest” reasons for granting
ATI.51 The DOT saw the possibility of granting ATI as an incen-
tive for countries to enter into open skies agreements with the
United States.52 The DOT believed that these types of air service
agreements would be more conducive to promoting competi-
tion than the old bilateral agreements.53
During the 2009 Star proceedings, as well as in 1992 at the
time of the original Northwest–KLM case, “the airline industry
[was] mired in [a] global economic recession.”54 Thus, the DOT
added that an antitrust immunity grant served the public inter-
est because it would “help Continental and the other [Star alli-
ance] participants manage cyclical changes in the industry to
preserve existing services, with a view towards increasing capac-
ity and enhancing competition between carriers and alli-
ances.”55 Effectively, alliances were seen as a way to protect and
augment the competitive position of the so-called legacy airlines
and to restore some degree of stability to the industry.56
Airlines, like companies in other industries, face a classic pris-
oner’s dilemma with regard to expected market growth.57 For
example, if there are four companies competing in a market
with each one currently having 25% of the total capacity, and
each company expects the market to grow by 20% over the next
three years, then each company faces the following dilemma:
does it expand its capacity by 20%, or does it try to capture the
entire growth in the market and thus expand its capacity by
80%?58
If there are economies of scale, technology adoption advan-
tages, bargaining advantages against suppliers or customers, or
other advantages in having a larger market share than competi-
tors—e.g., the S-curve phenomenon in the airline industry—
then each company might be tempted to capture the entire ex-
51 See Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants, supra note 22, at 467.
52 See Air Transport Conference, supra note 28, at 2.
53 See TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 10.
54 See Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants, supra note 22, at 467.
55 Id. at 467 (alterations in original).
56 See TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 3.
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pected growth of the market.59 Otherwise, if a company falls be-
hind one or more of its competitors, it might be driven out of
the market altogether. Of course, there is the downside of grow-
ing too rapidly as the capability to manage the growth is exacer-
bated by the increased complexity.
If the companies cooperate, they would likely agree to in-
crease their respective capacities by 20%. If the market grew by
20%, no excess capacity would materialize, and there would be
no need to compete aggressively, especially on price, to fully
utilize the existing capacity. However, without cooperation, each
company would likely increase its capacity by more than 20%
and up to 80%, depending on the managements’ confidence.
This would cause substantial excess capacity and inevitable price
wars.
Before Star Alliance’s creation in 1997, overinvestment in ca-
pacity, price wars, and poor financial performance tainted the
airline industry.60 Alliances provided a mechanism for avoiding
the prisoner’s dilemma downside by controlling fleet and route
expansion.61
III. ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR COOPERATION
AMONG AIRLINES
Airlines can work together by interlining, code-sharing, creat-
ing a joint venture, or through partial and complete acquisi-
tions. The OECD spelled out the advantages of interlining and
code-sharing and the distinctions between them:
Interlining makes multi-carrier journeys seamless: at a transit air-
port, passengers do not have to collect their luggage or to check
59 Urs Bingelli & Lucio Pompeo, Analyst Viewpoint: Does the S-Curve Still Exist?,
INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N (Sept. 2006), https://www.iata.org/publications/eco
nomics/Reports/Mckinsey_SCurve.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUS2-74HU].
60 See 30 Seconds About Us: Star Alliance Leads the Way, STAR ALLIANCE, https://
www.staralliance.com/en/about [https://perma.cc/JUP7-USRK].
61 In the classic, perfect competition models, which have been at the core of
economic theory for decades and serve as the ideal to be replicated by competi-
tion policy, the entry and exit process is not stable. Without anyone controlling
this process, it is easy to demonstrate that once there is a demand or supply shock
in such models, and given their underlying assumptions, especially of perfect in-
formation, instability and the inability to restore a new equilibrium are the out-
comes. The now discredited theory of contestability, which spurred the move to
deregulate the U.S. airline industry in the 1970s, is based on assumptions of per-
fect information, zero entry and exit costs, and the possibility of a hit-and-run
entry. Contestable Market Theory, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/c/contestablemarket.asp [https://perma.cc/9E9W-4S2Q].
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in again, and their baggage will automatically follow through to
their final destination. Deeper and more effective interlining co-
operation emerged through code-sharing agreements. Under a
code-share agreement, a flight operated by one carrier (“operat-
ing carrier”) can be marketed by partner airlines too (“market-
ing carriers”) under their own code and designator. In other
words, code-sharing allows two or more airlines to share the same
flight while selling tickets on this flight as their own.62
Code-sharing provides two advantages over interlining. This
strategy enables an airline to advertise that it has a more exten-
sive network than it operates with its own aircraft.63 And code-
shared flights are listed separately in global distribution systems,
thus increasing the likelihood that someone searching for a
flight between two destinations will limit the search and select
one of the code-share flights. Otherwise, code-sharing adds little
incremental value to simple interlining.
Alliances facilitate a more comprehensive system of code-shar-
ing with added features such as access to a larger selection of
lounges and the ability to receive frequent flyer credits with
more airlines.64 Interline agreements also could include access
to more lounges and expand the scope for receiving frequent-
flyer credits. Author Vinay Bhaskara has noted the following:
Joint Ventures are better for airlines than normal code share or
blocked space agreements because they allow for the explicit co-
ordinating of schedules, sharing of revenues/costs, and (in a
more cynical sense) the blatant control or reduction of capacity
and thus increase in fares and profits in previously competitive
markets.65
Interlining should not raise any concerns for competition au-
thorities. Indeed, interlining should be beneficial for both con-
sumers and competition.
Similarly, there should not be any competition concerns with
code-sharing,66 unless the airlines explicitly forbid interlining
with other airlines. In the case of alliances, if the members of
the alliances are not allowed to enter into interline agreements
62 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 37, at 10.
63 See id.
64 Id. at 27.
65 Vinay Bhaskara, The Global Airline Alliances are Outdated, AIRWAYS MAG. (Apr.
8, 2016, 1:02 PM), https://airwaysmag.com/industry/global-airline-alliances-out
dated/ [https://perma.cc/BP6X-7VRC].
66 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 37, at 29 n.149 (agreeing that “Code-shar-
ing or co-operation regarding check in, gate terminal, lounge, luggage, would
not usually require immunity”).
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with non-alliance airlines, such exclusivity provisions could
cause market foreclosure.67 For example, preventing non-alli-
ance airlines to interline with one or more alliance members
could deprive the non-alliance airline of feed at one or more
alliance hub airports and, thus, limit the ability of the non-alli-
ance airline to offer a competitive service on certain routes be-
yond the hub(s).68
Even joint ventures do not require antitrust immunity but for
the per se rule in the United States. Either they create net bene-
fits for consumers, or they act in an anticompetitive manner.69
The competition authorities could determine which is the case
ex post and take actions if the joint venture proved to be anticom-
petitive. Of course, the other “public interest” benefits cited by
the DOT would have to be considered as well if the lessening
competition costs exceeded the efficiency and other benefits of
a joint venture. But as is argued below, the open skies policy and
the financial stability public interest benefits are both questiona-
ble. William Gillespie and Oliver Richard, both with the U.S.
Department of Justice, partially agree and disagree with this
view:
If the alliance partners are not competitors (as could be true on
many routes like Atlanta-Toulouse), then no antitrust immunity
is needed and the partners may jointly decide on fares and other
67 Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨schelrath, Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alli-
ances, 14–16, 33 (Ctr. For Eur. Research, Discussion Paper No. 10-080, 2014),
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10080.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
68 See id. The non-alliance airline might not be able to operate at all on select
routes, multiple daily flights, or even single daily flights on certain routes. See id.
This would place the airline at a competitive disadvantage, especially in attracting
business travelers and time-sensitive leisure travelers. See id.
69 See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2017); Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); TFEU, supra note 27, arts. 101–02; Competition Act,
supra note 27, §§ 75, 77–78. While PanAm, TWA, and Laker Airways all failed
prior to the creation of the first major alliance, PanAm and TWA failed primarily
because they lacked domestic market feed, and Laker Airways failed because of
predatory pricing and capacity expansion on the London to U.S. routes. See, e.g.,
Robert J. Byrne, Lots of Reasons Why Pan Am Failed, WASH. POST, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/01/25/lots-of-reasons-why-
pan-am-failed/ec58b7ee-7287-496c-8a63-343a25d2fce9/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.4eeac99f60ca [https://perma.cc/WJF6-AK8L]. And several Canadian air-
lines (e.g., Zoom, Harmony, Skyservice, Canada 3000), serving international mar-
kets, have failed in part due to a lack of domestic feed both in Canada and in
foreign markets. See, e.g., What Went Wrong at Canada 3000? One Analyst’s View,
CBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/what-went-wrong-
at-canada-3000-one-analyst-s-view-1.260214 [https://perma.cc/P7HX-RSMV]
(noting Canada 3000’s failed attempt to enter the domestic market).
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competitively sensitive matters. If the alliance partners are com-
petitors, and the alliance agreement is arm’s-length, then the car-
rier operating the flight determines seat availability for the
marketing partner but each airline sets prices competitively. All
sales revenues go to the operating carrier, and the marketing car-
rier gets a booking fee to cover handling costs. The partners may
in certain instances adjust flight schedules and operations to pro-
vide seamless service on code-share flights. They may also agree
to link their frequent-flyer programs to allow a customer to use
frequent-flyer miles accumulated with one airline to redeem
awards with a partner. If the alliance partners are competitors
and the alliance agreement is granted antitrust immunity, then
the partners may jointly decide on fares, schedules, and other
competitively sensitive matters across the routes that they include
in the alliance agreement.70
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
GRANTING ATI TO ALLIANCES
A. DIVERSIFICATION
One of the perceived benefits of alliances and joint ventures
was the ability of airlines to diversify their market presence.
They no longer depended on their respective domestic markets
and a handful of international flights from their domestic hubs.
Geographic diversification should have reduced revenue and
profit variability, and lessened bankruptcy risks—one of the
public interest benefits the DOT expected.
Finance principles demonstrate how diversification reduces fi-
nancial risks, as long as the prices of different asset classes or
economic conditions in different geographic or product mar-
kets are negatively correlated.71 The problem the alliances en-
countered in 2001–2002 and 2008–2009 was that economic
conditions in various geographic markets tended to be positively
correlated.72 That is, an economic downturn in one market was
70 Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants, supra note 22, at 445–46.
71 Ian Huntsley, Diversification: Its All About (Asset) Class, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/asset-class.asp [https://
perma.cc/H5CX-YTPT]. Finance principles support that individual investors can
diversify their portfolios more completely and at a lower cost than companies.
William Craig, Business Diversification: The Risk and the Reward, FORBES (Apr. 24,
2015, 2:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamcraig/2015/04/24/busi
ness-diversification-the-risk-and-the-reward/#486650da7d09 [https://perma.cc/
262G-TB5T] (generally noting the difficulty of business diversification).
72 See John Edwards, 4 Reasons Why Market Correlation Matters, INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-advisors/02
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accompanied by economic downturns in almost every other
market as a consequence of global economic integration.73
Thus, diversification did not enable the airlines to minimize the
impacts of negative economic shocks.74 Indeed, the effects were
compounded.
Furthermore, being part of an alliance did not help the major
carriers in the United States and Canada from escaping bank-
ruptcy. Notable bankruptcies include: US Airways (August
2002–March 2003); United (December 2002–February 2006);
Air Canada (April 2003–September 2004); US Airways (Septem-
ber 2004–September 2005, acquired by America West); North-
west (September 2005–May 2007, acquired by Delta); Delta
(September 2005–April 2007); and American (November
2011–December 2013).75 The data in Table 1 shows how the op-
erating revenues of all U.S. carriers declined sharply in all mar-
kets between 2000 and 2002, and 2008 and 2009.76 The airlines
could run in the alliances, but they could not shield themselves





75 U.S. Airline Bankruptcies, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA, http://airlines.org/dataset/
u-s-bankruptcies-and-services-cessations/ [https://perma.cc/D83N-ZXUS] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2018).
76 See infra Table 1.
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Table 1. Operating Revenues Totals, All U.S. Carriers,
2000–2016 (U.S. $000)77
 Domestic Latin  
America 
Atlantic Pacific 
2000 98,990 6,805 13,020 10,020 
2001 86,520 6,534 12,084 8,793 
2002 79,287 6,085 11,074 9,245 
2003 88,870 6,401 11,727 8,976 
2004 100,903 7,364 13,635 10,769 
2005 111,858 8,619 15,565 12,618 
2006 120,907 10,301 17,752 13,685 
2007 124,503 11,804 20,712 14,346 
2008 129,728 13,468 23,455 15,495 
2009 109,681 11,321 18,882 11,914 
2010 119,074 13,374 21,972 15,864 
2011 132,822 15,270 22,998 17,441 
2012 135,830 15,955 22,677 17,666 
2013 139,145 17,383 23,453 17,025 
2014 145,872 17,559 24,348 17,177 
2015 146,932 16,246 23,205 16,375 
2016 152,099 15,646 23,415 16,564 
Source: US DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, transtats.bts.gov 
B. COOPERATION
Another expected benefit of alliances, and of a joint venture
granted ATI, was the ability of the airlines to work together to
reduce costs, generate benefits for passengers, and improve
their profitability. The DOT supported ATI and metal neutrality
to incentivize the immunized airlines to cooperate.78
Proponents of the argument that only alliances and joint ven-
tures could cooperate sufficiently to generate benefits conve-
niently overlooked several problems. First, they ignored the
different ownership structures among the alliance members.
77 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Operating Revenue, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?Data=7 [https://
perma.cc/DKL6-S3V8].
78 See Bilotkach & Hu¨schelrath, supra note 67, at 22.
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There are several airlines in each of the alliances that are state-
owned or controlled, or where the national government has a
significant minority stake.79 The following are some examples:
• Star: Air China (majority); Air India; Air New Zealand
(majority); Croatia Airlines; Egyptair; Ethiopian; LOT;
SAS (majority); Singapore (majority); South African; TAP
(majority); Thai (majority); Turkish (significant
minority)80
• Oneworld: Finnair (majority); Malaysia; Qatar; Royal
Jordanian (majority); SriLankan (Qatar owns 20% of IAG
and 10% of Latam)81
• SkyTeam: Aeroflot; Aerolineas Argentinas; Air France (mi-
nority); Garuda (majority); Kenya (significant minority);
Saudia; Tarom; Vietnam.82
It is unlikely that the airlines in which their respective govern-
ments own equity stakes (ranging from a significant minority to
100%) have the same objectives as privately-owned airlines. Em-
ployment and economic development are key goals for the air-
lines with significant government ownership.83 To further
complicate matters, there are different legal regimes for labor in
each country.
Second, compiling a number of different management teams
is not likely to produce high levels of cooperation and coordina-
tion. Within each alliance, there are two or three carriers that
would likely dominate and dictate the strategy for the entire alli-
ance. And it is most unlikely that the Chinese carriers that have
joined the alliances would accept the leadership of any other
airlines.84 More likely, they view an alliance as a partnership in
which over time they will have more influence. This inevitably
79 List of Government-Owned and Privatized Airlines, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.
(2016), https://www.icao.int/sustainability/SiteAssets/Pages/Eap_ER_Databases
/FINAL_Airlines%20Privatization.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6FL-MX52].
80 Id. at 3, 5–6, 8, 12–13, 15–17.
81 Id. at 6, 9–10, 13, 16.
82 Id. at 1, 6, 8–9, 13, 15, 19.
83 Melanie Lieberman, Why the United States Doesn’t Have a National Airline,
TRAVEL & LEISURE (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-
airports/national-flag-carrier-explainer [https://perma.cc/25YZ-CMBE].
84 See Dan Reed, American Airlines Finally Gets Its Long-Sought Key to China’s Front
Door—Or Does It?, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2017/03/
29/american-airlines-finally-gets-its-long-sought-key-to-chinas-front-door-or-does-
it/#227cce8a609c [https://perma.cc/7E5Y-9B9E] (suggesting that it was difficult
for airlines to enter the Chinese market and get Chinese airlines to join global
alliances).
2018] ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 807
will lead to more friction with each alliance member. Airline
management and employees generally believe that their busi-
ness practices and pricing strategies (including the frequent-
flyer rules, ancillary charges, etc.) are the “best in class.”85 Thus,
they are reluctant to cede authority over those practices to an-
other alliance partner. Author Vinay Bhaskara has pointed out
conflicts within Oneworld, for example:
[T]here is a sense that the alliances are getting unwieldy, with
members frequently finding themselves at cross-purposes with
one another. In particular, oneworld has a tangled set of partner-
ships that call into question the future for some of its members.
For example, American Airlines has close ties (including anti-
trust immunity [ATI]) with Qantas, British Airways parent Inter-
national Airlines Group (IAG), and Japan Airlines, as well as
strong ties with Cathay Pacific. Japan Airlines also has anti-trust
immunity and close ties with IAG.
However, cooperation between Japan Airlines and Cathay Pa-
cific or Qantas is non-existent. Additionally, Cathay Pacific and
Qantas have entered into head-to-head combat over Qantas’ pro-
posed Jetstar Hong Kong operation which in turn would see
Qantas partner with Skyteam member China Eastern to offer low-
cost competition at Cathay’s primary hub at Hong Kong.
Cathay Pacific also has close ties with Star Alliance member Air
China (in which it holds a reciprocal equity share), that likely
detracts from its contribution to oneworld. Separately, Qantas
and IAG used to have deep ties and ATI on the Kangaroo route,
but Qantas ditched IAG in favor of unaligned Emirates while IAG
has gotten closer with Emirates’ rival Qatar Airways, who now
owns 9.99% of IAG. And to top things off, while Qatar Airways is
an actual member of oneworld, American Airlines seems to pre-
fer partnering with its unaligned rival and fellow MEB3 carrier
Etihad.86
Never underestimate the importance of self-interest.
Third, all the airlines in each respective alliance are unlikely
to be using the same information technology (IT) platform. For
example, in the Oneworld alliance, American and LATAM are
85 See 30 Seconds About Us: Star Alliance Leads the Way, STAR ALLIANCE, https://
www.staralliance.com/en/about [https://perma.cc/4Y47-AXGP]; About
Oneworld—Travelling the World, ONEWORLD, https://www.oneworld.com/general/
about-oneworld [https://perma.cc/8NG4-DW5P]; Caring More About You,
SKYTEAM, https://www.skyteam.com/en/about/ [https://perma.cc/2ZNK-
GS9A].
86 Bhaskara, supra note 65.
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on Sabre, S7 is on SITA, and all the others are on Amadeus.87
Transitioning from one platform to another is complicated,
costly, and risky.88 Without a common platform, it is difficult to
fully coordinate all the activities of the alliance airlines.89 Re-
cently, Delta’s CEO acknowledged that airlines “do not typically
upgrade IT after mergers.”90 Instead, they “pil[e] one legacy sys-
tem . . . on top of another.”91 “With multiple mergers going back
decades,” computer networks have retained their 1990s charac-
teristics.92 As cited in the American Prospect, “[t]hese mergers
were actually sold on the basis of creating ‘efficiencies,’ specifi-
cally from integrating computer systems. But the efficiencies sel-
dom work out, and the integration costs always end up higher
than the initial estimate.”93
C. COMPLEXITY AND SCALE
How large is too large? When do diseconomies of scale, which
are inevitable as a company scales up, overwhelm any economies
of scale, density, and scope? Are the alliances too large and thus
too complex to coordinate and manage? As an example, Star
Alliance airlines operate 4,764 aircraft and employ 431,040 peo-
ple.94 Is this alliance too large? What about Oneworld, which
operates 3,447 aircraft and employs 397,682 people?95 Surpris-
87 See Oneworld at a Glance, ONEWORLD, https://www.oneworld.com/news-infor-
mation/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/U7HK-
N2R7] (last updated Sept. 18, 2018).
88 See Charisse Jones & Elizabeth Weise, Travel Trouble? Here’s Why Your Airline
Flight is Delayed, USA TODAY (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2016/08/11/airlines-complex-aging-systems-lead-to-flight-delaying-com
puter-glitches/88539190/ [https://perma.cc/7DFG-35PA].
89 See id. The author recently booked flights to Europe on the Air Canada web-
site. He had no problem selecting a seat on his outbound flight because it was an
Air Canada flight. However, he was unable to select his seat on the return flight
because a Star Alliance partner, Brussels Airlines, operated it. Obviously, Air Ca-
nada’s IT system does not integrate fully with that of Brussels Airlines. Undoubt-
edly, one can find many other such examples of incompatibility between the IT
systems of alliance airlines.









95 See Oneworld at a Glance, supra note 87.
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ingly, these questions do not seem to have been asked by either
regulators or academics. The oft-cited report by the EC and
DOT did allude to this possibility:
On the downside, while growing in size is important for the net-
work, a large alliance unavoidably increases the complexity of
governance, and risks rendering it less efficient in decision mak-
ing and more difficult to integrate. Alliances, therefore, balance
the trade-off between, on the one hand, an increment in global
network and increased revenue synergies, and, on the other
hand, the risk of inefficiencies due to increased size of the
alliance.96
The expansion of operations at key hub airports, following
the creation of an alliance and especially the creation of a joint
venture, also has added more complexity for management. The
expansion can take two forms: more flights during each bank
during the day or an additional bank of flights during the day.
The former is likely to exhaust available slots, gates, or check-in
counters during the two-to-three-hour period of each bank. As a
result, that might be the preferred option for the alliance mem-
bers. This election might effectively limit or even eliminate com-
petition during such periods. Adding a bank of flights might
remove or limit the availability of slots for longer periods of time
at the major hubs. With multiple banks during the day, few time-
attractive slots might be available for non-alliance airlines.
The expansion of operations undoubtedly leads to greater
pressure on ground and airport personnel, and any weather or
maintenance-induced delays or cancellations would have greater
ripple effects throughout the alliance network.97 Even with ac-
cess to additional aircraft and crews, it could take several days to
clear up the overhang at hubs from major delays and cancella-
tions.98 The OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Af-
fairs has noted the following:
Airport congestion today is arguably the most critical barrier de-
terring entry into certain routes. Airport congestion occurs
where demand exceeds airport capacity.
. . . According to IATA, as of April 2014, there were around 167
congested airports in the world: 100 in Europe, 36 in the Asia-
96 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 9.
97 See Jeff Edwards, Study Finds “Rebanking” Trend in U.S. May Lead to Stranded
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Pacific region, 13 in North Asia, 11 in Middle East and Africa and
only 7 in America. Various studies show that the problem of con-
gestions is most acute at major hub airports, such as London
Heathrow, Frankfurt and New York JFK.99
Thus, just as one can ask if an airline or alliance has become too
large, one can ask a similar question about airports. Have any of
the airports become too heavily used, increasing the problems
and costs of congestions and delays?
D. EFFICIENCIES
One of the key arguments in support of ATI for joint ventures
was that cooperation would enable the airlines to fully realize
the potential from economies of density. A high proportion of
costs for each flight tends to be fixed and independent of the
number of passengers or distance of the flight (RPKs). There-
fore, the more passengers per flight and the higher the load
factors, the lower would be the fixed costs per flight, and likely
so too would be the average costs per flight (per passenger, and
per RPK). ATI should lead to higher load factors and more
economies of density.
Authors Hokey Min and Seong-Jong Joo found that joint ven-
tures in the airline industry do not appear to have improved the
competitive position of the member airlines. They explained:
. . . we argue that strategic alliances are neutral to competitive
advantages in this study. In fact, Porter (1990) pointed out that
the effects of alliances could be temporary and seldom provided
competitive advantages to their participants. Our finding is con-
gruent with Porter’s observation.
. . . .
. . . [R]egardless of the potential benefits of airline alliances
through collaboration such as joint marketing, coordinated
flight scheduling, combined frequent-flyer programs, airport fa-
cility sharing, joint maintenance and ground support, we did not
find any competitive advantage attributed to strategic alliances.
. . . .
Defying the conventional wisdom, we found no significant differ-
ences in airline performances between airlines with strategic alli-
ances and airlines without alliances. Also, it should be noted that
airline performances before and after joining alliances did not
show any signs of improvements.
That is to say, airline alliances did not necessarily improve the
participating airline’s comparative operating efficiency despite its
99 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 37, at 15 (emphasis in original).
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cost saving potentials due to shared resources and customer
bases.100
The load factor data in the table below for the United States
show improvement on domestic and international flights since
2002.101 But it is debatable how much of the improvement can
be attributed to the schedule reconfiguration of the immunized
alliances and economies of density, and how much to the eco-
nomic recovery post-2009, capacity control by the alliances, and
yield management systems that have become more adept at fill-
ing planes (an advantage of machine learning).
100 Hokey Min & Seong-Jong Joo, A Comparative Performance Analysis of Airline
Strategic Alliances Using Data Envelopment Analysis, 52 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 99,
104–05, 109 (2016) (internal citations omitted).
101 See infra Table 2. The author did not start in 1999 because the load factors
dropped sharply in 2001, which would have distorted the data. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Load Factors (passenger-miles as a proportion of
available seat-miles in percent (%)), All U.S. and Foreign
Airlines, All Major U.S. Airports,102 2002–2017103
 Domestic International 
2002 71.4 75.3 
2003 73.9 74.8 
2004 75.5 77.6 
2005 78.5 78.5 
2006 80.2 78.3 
2007 81.2 78.8 
2008 81.1 77.4 
2009 82.3 78.1 
2010 83.3 81.3 
2011 83.8 80.0 
2012 84.2 81.3 
2013 84.4 81.7 
2014 85.3 80.6 
2015 85.8 80.1 
2016 85.4 80.1 
2017 85.4 80.1 
Source: US DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, transtats.bts.gov 
There is also evidence that post-ATI the joint ventures have
not increased their frequencies in the United States or Europe,
contrary to what was expected because of their supposed supe-
rior service offerings for passengers. Several authors found the
following in Europe:
The number of intra-European flights decreased significantly for
the three alliances. . . . On the contrary, the growth of LCCs has
been remarkable, with offered flights and seat capacity increased
by 58% (1,396 in 2006 vs. 2,211 in 2016) and 74% (207,571 in
102 Major airports: Atlanta, Baltimore–Washington, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago
Midway, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas–Fort Worth, Denver, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale,
Honolulu, Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York,
Newark, LaGuardia, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Salt Lake City,
San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, D.C. Reagan, Washington Dulles.
103 Bureau Transp. Statistics, Load Factor, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.
transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=5 [https://perma.cc/VU35-DSBL].
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2006 vs. 361,547 in 2016), respectively. As a result, the intra-Euro-
pean market share of LCCs in terms of seat capacity increased
significantly from 31.7% in 2006 to 45% in 2016. On the other
hand, while all three alliances decreased their shares on the in-
tra-European network to focus on less-contended long-haul mar-
kets, Skyteam shows the highest losses, especially in terms of seat
capacity, with a drop from 16.7% in 2006 to 11.7% in 2016 . . . .
Looking at direct connections, when direct flights are available,
the contraction of alliances’ offers is evident. Specifically, in 2006
they offered 38.7% (2,212) of direct quickest connections. The
figure decreased to 32% (1,915) in 2016, while the share offered
by Ryanair and easyJet doubled from 14.3% to 28.6%. However,
the expansion of LCCs is much less pronounced when looking at
indirect connections . . . in terms of available indirect connec-
tions, the European scenario deteriorated significantly from 2006
to 2016 . . . the alliances retreat from the European market to
concentrate on intercontinental destinations caused a reduction
of indirect connectivity, as the flights from secondary airports to
their respective hubs reduced. The new point- to-point flights of-
fered by LCCs could not offset the connectivity loss because of
their lack of coordination, even when offered from their major
bases in Europe. Indeed, new indirect connectivity only occurred
“by accident,” in some cases even against the strategy of LCCs,
which often opposed the ‘self-help connections’ carried out by
their passengers. Only recently, Ryanair and easyJet began evalu-
ating the introduction of some forms of coordination to facilitate
their passengers’ indirect transfers.104
In the United States, the DOT reported that between 2007
and 2012 airlines cut the number of domestic passenger flights
by 16–24%—the biggest drops occurred at midsize and smaller
regional airports.105 According to the DOT, the reason was sim-
ple: airlines decided that the best way to earn a healthy return
on their investment was to maintain tight discipline on capac-
ity.106 And the way they have accomplished this was by concen-
trating service on the big domestic and international markets
and by cutting flights in smaller, less traveled ones. The data in
Table 3 show that since peaking in 2005, aircraft departures in
the United States have declined by 19% as of 2017.107
104 Mattia Cattaneo et al., Evolution of the European Network and Implications for
Self-Connection, 65 J. OF AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 18, 21–22 (2017).
105 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CC-2012-029, AVIATION INDUSTRY PERFORM-
ANCE: A REVIEW OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY, 2008–2011 12 (2012).
106 Id. at 25.
107 See infra Table 3.
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Table 3: Aircraft Departures and Scheduled Passengers,
United States, 1997–2017 (000s)108




1997 8,534 594,727 
1998 8,730 612,882 
1999 9,062 635,959 
2000 9,450 666,149 
2001 9,120 622,129 
2002 9,516 614,277 
2003 11,192 647,470 
2004 11,766 703,692 
2005 11,884 738,628 
2006 11,553 744,728 
2007 11,686 769,622 
2008 11,144 743,313 
2009 10,383 703,901 
2010 10,361 720,496 
2011 10,336 730,797 
2012 10,127 736,701 
2013 9,979 743,171 
2014 9,803 762,710 
2015 9,738 798,221 
2016 9,866 822,972 
2017 9,635 849,265 
Source: Airlines for America, derived from DOT Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics. 
CAPA pointed out that the “[ATI] approvals for the existing
three main JVs on North Atlantic, which were granted immunity
in period 2008–2010,” did not lead to capacity growth—based
on total ASKs between Europe and North America—between
108 See generally Bureau Transp. Stats., Airline Information for Download, U.S.
DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.bts.gov/topics/airlines-and-airports/airline-informa
tion-download [https://perma.cc/2TBR-GX4T].
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2007 and 2013.109 But this was largely the result of the financial
crisis in 2007 and the recession that followed.110 Since 2013, ca-
pacity has grown 28% by summer 2016.111
Based on a survey conducted in 2002 of the alliance manage-
ment departments of airlines participating in the four global al-
liances, Authors Iatrou and Alamdari found that:
The least pronounced impacts have been observed in the areas
of costs and fares. As far as costs are concerned, not only have
airlines not reaped much benefit from their alliance participa-
tion but have entailed certain substantial initial expenses such as
IT system harmonization, marketing and advertising expenses
which could put a serious strain, at least short term, on the air-
line costs. [Any] [s]ignificant long-term cost reductions/syner-
gies require the alignment of some product specifications, [a]
common approach, [a] common fleet planning and require not
only some time and a high degree of integration but also a major
commitment on the part of the allies.112
More recently, Michael Wisbrun, the CEO of SkyTeam, noted
that “there are limits to the ability of alliances to deliver cost
synergies”: “We don’t go as far as joint aircraft procurement . . .
We are too big to create these kinds of traditional synergies, or,
for example engine buying.”113
The data in Tables 4 and 5 do not reveal any positive correla-
tion between various measures of productivity (revenue per em-
ployee; RPK per employee; employees per aircraft) and size of
airlines (as measured by passenger revenues).114 These findings
do not provide any support for the belief that as an airline be-
comes larger, productivity increases.115 Furthermore, large dis-
crepancies continue to exist among the airlines in each of the
measures of productivity, suggesting that membership in an alli-
ance does not necessarily lead to a convergence in productiv-
109 North Atlantic Airline Market. Closed JVS to have 78% of ASKs in 2016. Weighing





112 Kostas Iatrou & Fariba Alamdari, The Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Alli-
ances on Airline Operations, 11 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 127, 129 (2005).
113 Airline Alliances – What Future? Global, Multilateral and Bilateral Partnerships
Are All Evolving, CAPA (Dec. 17, 2013), https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/
reports/airline-alliances—what-future-global-multilateral-and-bilateral-partner
ships-are-all-evolving-144593 (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
114 See infra Tables 4 and 5.
115 See infra Tables 4 and 5.
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ity.116 The gaps most likely represent differences in ownership
structures, management capabilities and their objectives, corpo-
rate structure (number of business units—degree of vertical in-
tegration), and idiosyncratic characteristics of the airlines and
geographic markets. The data cannot tell us if membership in
an alliance improves productivity over time as compared to non-
membership in an alliance.117
116 See infra Tables 4 and 5.
117 Productivity has likely increased for all airlines, especially the legacy air-
lines, because airline management has realized that a major cost advantage for
the low-cost carriers (LCCs) and ultra-low cost carriers (ULCCs) was their ability
to cram more seats into a plane. Conor Shine, Why Airlines Can’t Stop Cramming
More and More Seats on Their Planes, DALLAS NEWS, https://www.dallasnews.com/
business/airlines/2017/11/17/airlines-stop-cramming-seats-planes [https://
perma.cc/S46K-9LB5]. If an airline increases the number of seats in a plane by
25%, the costs per available seat per kilometer will decrease substantially because
overall costs will increase by much less than 25%. Most airlines have increased the
seating density in their aircraft. Id. This had nothing to do with being in an alli-
ance. Rather, this change occurred as legacy airlines have tried to improve their
cost competitiveness. Id.
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Star 164,040  380.6  3,850  90.5  
Adria 169 27 436.7 10 3,824 14 32.3 1 
Aegean 964 24 460.6 8 5,638 4 44.5 4 
Air Canada 11,080 4 369.3 14 4,103 8 82.2 12 
Air China 10,240 5 440.3 9 8,092 1 61.0 5 
Air India 3,100 16 160.7 27 2,002 23 170.7 26 
ANZ 3,500 14 304.3 18 2,887 18 111.7 17 
ANA 16,300 3 1,253.8 1 6,508 2 50.8 4 
Asiana 5,120 9 508.5 6 3,992 11 119.9 19 
Austrian 2,300 19 356.6 15 2,884 19 80.6 11 
Avianca 4,100 12 195.2 23 1,819 26 116.0 18 
Brussels 1,387 23 396.3 13 3,629 15 70.0 7 
Copa 1,970 21 244.1 21 3,520 16 84.9 13 
Croatia 237 26 262.7 19 1,608 27 75.2 10 
Egyptair 1,500 22 166.7 26 1,933 24 145.2 23 
Ethiopian 2,530 17 187.6 24 2,017 22 153,2 25 
Eva 3,300 15 324.4 17 4,021 10 139.3 21 
LOT 930 25 550.3 3 5,462 5 35.2 2 
Lufthansa 18,120 2 503.3 7 4,056 9 102.9 16 
SAS 5,700 8 532.2 4 3,445 17 68.7 6 
Shenzhen 3,790 13 169.0 25 1,918 25 130.4 20 
Singapore 8,660 7 585.1 2 6,372 3 139.6 22 
SAA 2,100 20 246.3 20 2,475 21 149.6 24 
Swiss 4,800 11 527.4 5 4,109 7 100.0 15 
TAP 2,450 18 335.6 16 3,863 12 91.3 14 
Thai 5,070 10 230.5 22 2,837 20 229.1 27 
Turkish 9,790 6 405.8 12 5,256 6 71.6 8 
United 36,600 1 418.3 11 3,863 13 71.7 9 
Source: Calculated from data on Star Alliance website 
118 See generally STAR ALLIANCE, https://www.staralliance.com/en/web/
staralliance/home [https://perma.cc/K33K-P8LD].
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Oneworld 123,174  309.7  2,865  115.4  
American 40,180 1 328.5 5 2,941 5 79.6 3 
IAG 16,888 2 266.4 6 3,113 4 119.8 4 
Cathay 11,960 4 504.2 1 5,207 3 125.5 5 
Finnair 2,442 9 484.0 2 5,372 2 69.1 2 
Japan 11,960 4 258.4 7 1,348 12 208.5 10 
Latam 9,527 7 207.5 11 2,474 8 139.6 6 
Malaysia 4,765 8 245.5 9 2,489 7 139.6 6 
Qantas 12,016 3 411.5 4 2,712 6 151.3 7 
Qatar 9,796 6 249.5 8 2,098 9 202.4 9 
Royal Jordanian 1,068 11 245.5 10 1,555 11 167.3 8 
S7 1,316 10 438.7 3 9,033 1 50.8 1 
SriLankan 906 12 130.2 12 1,825 10 331.4 13 
Source: Calculated from data on Oneworld Alliance website 
E. DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION
A common argument in support of ATI is that this would pro-
duce lower prices on connecting routes that are separately run
monopolies.120 For example, if one airline has a monopoly on
route A–B, and another airline has a monopoly on route B–C,
and the two airlines did not cooperate on price, then the
“double monopoly” would produce a combined fare for A–C
that would be greater than if it were operated by a single mo-
nopoly or immunized JV. Prior to the creation of the joint ven-
ture, each airline would add its monopoly mark-up, ignoring the
negative impact this would have on the combined fare and de-
mand on route A–C.121 A single monopoly would add a single
mark-up, and with a lower price, generate more traffic and
larger revenues than the combined revenues of the previously
119 See generally ONEWORLD ALLIANCE, https://www.oneworld.com/ [https://
perma.cc/8PPH-JEAY].
120 Jan K. Brueckner et al., Revisiting Alliances, Codesharing, Antitrust Immunity
and International Airfares: Findings from a New Economic Study, INT’L AIR TRANSP.
ASS’N 1, 2 (Oct. 2010), https://www.iata.org/publications/economics/Reports/
Brueckner_Alliances.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPU4-8895].
121 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 21–22.
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unrelated two monopolists.122 There are several problems with
this argument.
First, the theoretical model assumes that each airline knows
its own demand curve and marginal costs and thus would select
the correct monopoly price. The reality, unlike the theory, is
that no company knows its full demand curve. At best, each
company might know two or three points on the demand curve,
and it might discover a few more through market research. But
significant gaps remain, and no company would likely be able to
determine its marginal revenue curve—an essential require-
ment to come up with the correct monopoly price. Moreover, it
is unlikely that any company knows its marginal cost curve, espe-
cially when it is engaged in the joint production of services, as is
the case in the airline industry. Hence, without knowledge of
both the marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves, an air-
line, like other companies in other industries, engages in a trial
and error process to determine its optimal prices.
Companies tend to engage in rule-of-thumb pricing whereby
they set prices by marking up their unit costs with the mark-up
influenced by the degree of rivalry.123 But it is unlikely, even in
monopoly markets or markets where there is a dominant com-
pany, that the mark-up approaches what a monopolist might set.
This might happen only by accident. Consequently, even if
there were a number of adjacent or consecutive monopoly
routes, it is possible that the combined mark-ups of the two mo-
nopolists could be less than the mark-up set by a single
monopolist.124
Yield management systems are intended to maximize reve-
nues per flight, but they all start with historic data, and as a re-
sult, the historic prices might not even be close to the monopoly
profit maximization levels.125 If you start with sub-optimal prices
and simply adjust them day-by-day and year-by-year, there is no
reason to believe that you will stumble across the monopoly
price—assuming that an airline has a monopoly on any route.
122 Demand is assumed to be price elastic in the airline industry. See Air Travel
Demand, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N 1, 5 (Apr. 2008), https://www.iata.org/
whatwedo/documents/economics/air_travel_demand.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V4LE-QJJ8]. Thus, when price declines, demand increases by relatively more and
total revenues increase as well. See id.
123 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 22.
124 Indeed, a single monopolist operating routes A–B and B–C could set a
mark-up on the route A–C well above what the theoretical profit-maximizing
mark-up should be.
125 See Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants, supra note 22, at 452.
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Another problem is the assumption that combining two mo-
nopolies through a joint venture would retain a monopoly on
the route A–C. One of the arguments used by the DOT to sup-
port ATI for all three alliances was that this would allow for in-
ter-alliance competition.126 If this argument is correct, then it is
conceivable that, while one airline might have had a monopoly
on route A–B and another on route B–C, unrelated airlines
might have had separate and adjacent monopolies on routes
A–D and D–C. These latter two airlines could join forces in a
competing alliance and create the competition on route A–C
that the DOT envisioned.
But interlining and through-fare negotiations and competi-
tion on both the A–C route via B and the A–C route via D could
produce the same competitive prices as two competing, immu-
nized JVs. If one airline had a monopoly on both routes A–B
and A–D and this airline formed a joint venture with another
airline that had a monopoly on route B–C, the new joint venture
might preclude the airline from connecting with a non-alliance
airline at D. Then, competition on the A–C route would disap-
pear. Competition would be replaced by a monopoly not only
on A–C but also possibly on many other routes connecting via B
or other alliance hubs. Market foreclosure caused by an unwill-
ingness to interline or code-share with non-alliance airlines
would reduce competition.
Finally, should not the focus of competition policy be to try to
augment competition rather than accept monopolies and opt
for so-called second-best solutions, assuming that second-best so-
lutions, such as the elimination of double monopoly mark-ups,
are in fact the next best alternative? The FTC has emphasized:
Free and open markets are the foundation of a vibrant economy.
Aggressive competition among sellers in an open marketplace
gives consumers—both individuals and businesses—the benefits
of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more
choices, and greater innovation. The FTC’s competition mission
is to enforce the rules of the competitive marketplace—the anti-
trust laws. These laws promote vigorous competition and protect
consumers from anticompetitive mergers and business
practices.127
126 See id.
127 Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-ad
vice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/53CD-
EQ5E].
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F. RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
The traditional economic theory in support of joint ventures,
particularly ATI, largely ignored the possibility that airlines
might engage in restrictive trade practices.128 The focus of the
regulators was on the number of surviving competitors on a
route, not on the potential to drive out competitors after the
fact.129 This alone should have caused the DOT and competition
authorities to impose time limits on their grants of ATI and ap-
proval of joint ventures. It is one thing to count the number of
competitors in a market pre- and post-approval of a joint ven-
ture. It is totally different and more difficult to predict what a
joint venture might do with regards to restricting competition.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and to a lesser extent the Clay-
ton Act and FTC Act, have described a number of restrictive
trade practices: refusal to supply, exclusive dealing or require-
ment contracts, exclusionary conduct, predatory or below-cost
pricing, and refusal to deal.130 Restrictive trade practices provi-
sions were developed to deal with relations between upstream
and downstream firms that could lessen competition in either or
both markets.131 The upstream firms supply goods and/or ser-
vices to the downstream firms. The downstream firms either sell
the goods or services directly to final customers—consumers or
other firms—or use the goods and services to produce other
goods or services that are in turn sold to firms further down-
stream in the value chain—that is, firms that are closer to the
final customers.
Airlines deal with many upstream suppliers of goods and ser-
vices (e.g., airports, maintenance companies, ground handlers,
aircraft manufacturers, leasing companies). But feed traffic
from one airline to another can and should be considered as a
transaction between an upstream supplier (the airline providing
the feed traffic) and a downstream customer (the airline taking
the feed traffic beyond the connecting airport). Thus, these two
128 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 21.
129 Id.
130 See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2017). Canada’s Competition Act
defines similar restrictive trade practices in §§ 75, 77 and 78: refusal to deal, ex-
clusive dealing, abuse of dominant position. Competition Act, supra note 27,
§§ 75, 77–78. There are comparable definitions in Articles 101 and 102 in the
EU. TFEU, supra note 27, arts. 101–02.
131 William Gillespie & Oliver Richard, Antitrust Immunity and International Air-
line Alliances 3–4 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Econ. Analysis Grp. Discussion Paper No.
EAG 11-1, 2012).
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provisions should cover the airline industry as well, even though
they were not developed with the airline industry in mind.
1. Access to Slots
As suggested above, if the added value alliances and joint ven-
tures supposedly created for customers translates into increased
demand, the airlines should increase frequencies of flights to
and from their hubs. They might also increase the size of air-
craft operating on a number of routes, especially hub-to-hub
routes. These actions should increase the number of flights
and/or passengers served during each bank at their hubs, as
well as lead to an additional bank of flights operating at each
hub. Either or both should reduce the availability of slots at the
hub airports and increase congestion on taxiways and gates.
Thus, despite the occasional requirement for carve-outs and re-
linquishing slots at key airports, access to slots and other airport
infrastructure could have been reduced, particularly at peak pe-
riods during the day and week.132
Authors Wu and Lee found that congestion did reduce the
availability of check-in counters, thus making it more difficult
for entry to occur at a major hub:
The busy day in terms of check-in counter demand took place on
Tuesday with a peak demand of 185 positions at 0830 h in the
morning, as a result of more concentrated morning departures
than the rest of the week. The most comprehensive allocations
were noted at check-in islands occupied by the home-based car-
rier, where the majority of the counters have been assigned from
0400 to 2200 h to process the airline’s regular departures, leaving
minimal residual capacities at these check-in areas. The over-
lapped check-in windows and combined passenger arrival
profiles can result in a more constant demand of counters over a
long period of time, which is not sustainable for a single flight
demand . . . . At the case airport’s international terminal where
check-in counters are scarce during the morning peaks, similar
common check-in arrangements could be extended to alliance
member airlines to co-locate and consolidate existing flight-
driven counter allocations and free up check-in capacities.133
132 See TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 24.
133 Cheng-Lung Wu & Andy Lee, The Impact of Airline Alliance Terminal Co-Loca-
tion on Airport Operations and Terminal Development, 36 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 69, 74
(2014).
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But it seems that alliance airlines have reduced their frequen-
cies in Europe and the United States.134 The theoretical possibil-
ity of reducing the availability of slots might not have
materialized, at least at a number of airports. But if this is the
case, then perhaps alliances and joint ventures have not created
that much value for customers, and a major argument in favor
of ATI might not be valid.
2. Market Foreclosure
Diana Moss, writing for the American Antitrust Institute, high-
lighted the importance of feed traffic:
Alliance carriers have maintained high market shares on impor-
tant transatlantic routes between Europe and the U.S. Long-haul
routes are difficult for smaller, non-allied airlines to enter. . . .
[T]he DOJ has shifted its focus to slot and gate divestitures in
domestic mergers and monopolization issues in order to en-
courage entry. . . .
. . . .
A second reason why higher concentration at alliance connect-
ing airports is potentially harmful to competition and consumers
is because dominance in connecting markets increases the risk
that non-alliance carriers will be foreclosed from interlining at
alliance hubs.135
So too did the EC and DOT:
Alliance partnership with other carriers can also significantly im-
prove access to feeder traffic of alliance partners—particularly
important for long-haul operations. While feeder traffic can also
be obtained outside of the global alliances through interlining
agreements such as an IATA multilateral proration arrangement
(“MPA”) or a bilateral proration agreement, airlines in an alli-
ance tend to favour their alliance partners in the financial terms
of their interlining and choose them for code-sharing. With the
increasing membership of alliances (and, respectively, their net-
work coverage), it may be difficult for unaligned carriers to se-
cure feeder traffic at some airports. This can therefore
encourage them to join an alliance to benefit from more attrac-
tive conditions for feeder traffic from fellow members.136
134 See Cattaneo et. al., supra note 104, at 26, tbl. 9.
135 Diana L. Moss, Revisiting Antitrust Immunity for International Airline Alliances,
AM. ANTITRUST INST. 1, 12, 16 (Mar. 28, 2018).
136 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 8.
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Market foreclosure can and does stifle entry and competition.
CAPA has provided some anecdotal evidence of the negative im-
pacts on competition when alliance airlines refuse to interline
with other airlines, even other members of the same alliance:
Exclusion from a JV carries other impacts: airberlin had to cancel
a proposed new route to Dallas, apparently because airberlin
could not secure the codeshares it needed from American at its
Dallas megahub. Airberlin required beyond-Dallas access to
make the route work, but American had no incentive to help a
competitor—despite being a oneworld partner—when such traf-
fic could more profitably flow over its network/JV.
In another example, LOT struggled to access beyond-Tokyo
codeshares on All Nippon Airways for its new Warsaw-Tokyo
flight. LOT’s problem was that ANA’s JV with Lufthansa forbade
ANA from cooperating with another European airline without
Lufthansa’s approval. Lufthansa approving LOT-ANA coopera-
tion, even if small, could impact the Lufthansa-ANA JV.137
3. Switching Costs
There is extensive literature in economics about switching
costs.138 Switching costs are the result of strategic decisions,
which impact rivalry.139 The more important switching costs are,
the more companies will focus on creating these costs to capture
their customers and deter entry.140 Because it would be costly to
attract away those customers locked in by switching costs, pro-
spective entrants become restricted to a subset of the entire mar-
ket.141 There are many examples of switching costs for
customers—free training for the customer’s employees, joint
product development with the customer, establishing supply
chain links with customers through B2B networks, developing
products that are incompatible with those of competitors, low
interest financing, etc.142 In the airline industry, the major
switching costs are frequent flyer programs and their offshoots,
137 Branded Global Alliances Aren’t Dead – Yet, CAPA (June 4, 2017), https://
centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/branded-global-alliances-arent-dead—
yet-348112 (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
138 See, e.g., Abhi Bhattarcharya, Switching Costs and Sustained Competitive Advan-
tage, 2 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. INVENTION 101, 102.
139 See id. at 103.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 106.
142 See generally id.
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elite status programs, and corporate discounts.143 By restricting
access to a frequent flyer program to only alliance airlines, an
airline makes it difficult for a non-alliance airline in the country
to compete for the frequent traveler.
V. ACADEMIC STUDIES
There is a vast economics literature testing the effects of alli-
ances, especially ATI for joint ventures, on costs, prices, and net-
works. But the literature can be summarized as a battle between
Bilotkach and Brueckner.144 Brueckner strongly believes that al-
liances and ATI have produced large benefits for travelers.145
Bilotkach, on the other hand, believes that the anti-competitive
effects of joint ventures have outweighed any efficiencies cre-
ated by alliances.146 For example, Bilotkach and Kai Hu¨schelrath
reported the following in one of their research papers:
143 Fredrik Carlsson & Asa Lofgren, Airline Choice, Switching Costs and Frequent
Flyer Programmes, 2006 APPLIED ECON. 1469, 1469 (2006).
144 See, e.g., Volodymyr Bilotkach, Price Competition Between International Airline
Alliances, 39 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 167 (2005); Volodymyr Bilotkach, Com-
plementary Versus Semi-Complementary Airline Partnerships, 41 TRANSP. RES. PART B
381 (2007); Volodymyr Bilotkach, Multimarket Contact and Intensity of Competition:
Evidence from an Airline Merger, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95 (2011); Volodymyr
Bilotkach et al., Scheduled Service Versus Personal Transportation: The Role of Distance,
40 REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN ECON. 40 (2010); Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨s-
chelrath, Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alliances, 7 J. COMPETITION LAW & ECON.
335 (2011); Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨schelrath, Airline Alliances and Antitrust
Policy: The Role of Efficiencies, 21 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 76 (2012); Jan K. Brueckner,
The Economics of International Codesharing: An Analysis of Airline Alliances, 19 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 1475 (2001); Jan K. Brueckner, International Airfares in the Age of Alli-
ances: The Effects of Codesharing and Antitrust Immunity, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 105
(2003); Jan K. Brueckner & Stef Proost, Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immu-
nity, 28 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 657 (2010); Jan K. Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, The
Price Effects of International Airline Alliances, 43 J. L. & ECON. 503 (2000); Jan K.
Brueckner et al., Alliances, Codesharing, Antitrust Immunity, and International
Airfares: Do Previous Patterns Persist?, 7 COMPETITION L. & ECON. 573 (2011); W.
Tom Whalen, A Panel Data Analysis of Code-Sharing, Antitrust Immunity, and Open
Skies Treaties in International Aviation Markets, 30 REV. INDUS. ORG. 39 (2007).
145 See generally Jan K. Brueckner, The Economics of International Codesharing: An
Analysis of Airline Alliances, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1475 (2001); Jan K. Brueckner,
International Airfares in the Age of Alliances: The Effects of Codesharing and Antitrust
Immunity, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 105 (2003); Jan K. Brueckner & Stef Proost,
Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity, 28 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 657 (2010); Jan
K. Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances,
43 J. L. & ECON. 503 (2000); Jan K. Brueckner et al., Alliances, Codesharing, Anti-
trust Immunity, and International Airfares: Do Previous Patterns Persist?, 7 COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 573 (2011).
146 See generally Volodymyr Bilotkach, Price Competition Between International Air-
line Alliances, 39 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 167 (2005); Volodymyr Bilotkach,
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We examine the issue of market foreclosure by airline partner-
ships with antitrust immunity. . . . [W]e find evidence consistent
with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to
accept connecting passengers from the outside carriers at respec-
tive hub airports. Following the antitrust immunity, airlines
outside the partnership reduce their traffic to the partner air-
lines’ hub airports by 4.1–11.5 percent. We suggest regulators
should take possible market foreclosure effects into account
when assessing the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for
airline alliances.
. . . .
A crucial feature of the airline industry is that the level of de-
mand on most city-pair markets is not sufficient to sustain regular
non-stop services.
. . . .
. . . Antitrust immunity can facilitate market foreclosure, as re-
spective alliance members will be reluctant to accept interline
passengers from the outside airlines. In fact, such a concern has
been specifically raised by American Airlines: the carrier claimed
that it has become more difficult for it to feed its passengers to
Air France’s flights at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport following
the granting of antitrust immunity to the Air France—Delta part-
nership within the SkyTeam alliance.
. . . .
. . . [D]espite the fact that it is unclear to what extent such effi-
ciencies are immunity-specific (and cannot be realized by lower
degrees of airline cooperation such as code-sharing), the exis-
tence of efficiencies as such does not rule out the possibility of
(larger) anti-competitive effects, especially if the efficiencies
come at the cost of increased market power and therefore an
enlarged ability and incentive to use that power in an anti-com-
petitive fashion. In other words, although it is typically true that
foreclosing on the outside of the partnership carriers enhances
efficiency gains of cooperation, it also reduces competition, leav-
ing the sign of the net effect of such a practice ambiguous.147
Complementary Versus Semi-Complementary Airline Partnerships, 41 TRANSP. RES. PART
B 381 (2007); Volodymyr Bilotkach, Multimarket Contact and Intensity of Competi-
tion: Evidence from an Airline Merger, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95 (2011); Volodymyr
Bilotkach et al., Scheduled Service Versus Personal Transportation: The Role of Distance,
40 REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN ECON. 40 (2010); Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨s-
chelrath, Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alliances, 7 J. COMPETITION LAW & ECON.
335 (2011); Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨schelrath, Airline Alliances and Antitrust
Policy: The Role of Efficiencies, 21 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 76 (2012).
147 Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hu¨schelrath, Airline Alliances, Antitrust Immunity,
and Market Foreclosure, Abstract, 1, 10 (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper
No. 10-083, 2012).
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They concluded:
Overall, our results suggest that bringing the possibility of market
foreclosure as a result of antitrust immunity into consideration
allows us to point to potential anti-competitive effects on markets
which have generally been considered immune to lower competi-
tion as a result of increased airline cooperation. Specifically, re-
view of antitrust immunity cases has been mostly concerned with
the potential for declining competition on markets between hub
airports of the partner airlines. It has been believed that airline
alliances should not affect competition on routes from alliance
members’ hub airports to non-hub gateways. We show that this
might not be true, and suggest that competition on all markets in-
volving a hub airport of a member of an alliance with antitrust immunity
might decrease through potential market foreclosure.148
On the other hand, in the footsteps of Brueckner, W. Tom
Whalen has presented the following results:
In empirical tests using a cross section of data from 1997,
[Brueckner and Whalen] find that interline fares on carriers with
alliances (code sharing or immunity) are on average 25% below
fares charged by non-alliance interline pairs.
Brueckner (2003) expands this analysis and finds, using a cross
section of data from 1999, that carriers with code sharing agree-
ments charge fares 8 to 17% below traditional interline pairs and
that fares on carrier with antitrust immunity are 17 to 30% lower
. . . .
This paper expands on the previous empirical results in several
ways. First, it makes use of a large data set that covers 11 years of
international traffic between the U.S. and Europe. Previous re-
search has relied on cross sectional variation, measuring the
price effect relative to non-alliance carriers for a given quarter,
while this data set covers the formation and, in some cases, termi-
nation of most major U.S.-European carrier alliances to date. In
general, the alliance price effects estimated in previous work are
robust to the better data, though the effects in this paper are
somewhat smaller. Immunity grants are associated with fares 14
to 22% lower than traditional interline and code sharing fares
are 5 to 10% lower. In addition, all else equal, immunized alli-
ance fares are often statistically identical to online fares. Because
online fares cannot be affected by double marginalization, this
result is consistent with the hypothesis that the primary effect of
the alliance is an internalization of this demand externality.149
148 Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
149 See Panel Data Analysis, supra note 144, at 4–5.
Because the purpose of this paper is to focuses [sic] on alliance
effects in markets where domestic and foreign carriers can provide
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The EC and DOT have noted:
It is clear that the regulatory changes engendered by the EU-U.S.
Air Transport Agreement, as amended, are significant. It will
therefore likely take several years for the market to adjust fully, so
that significant further evolution cannot be excluded. For in-
stance, with fewer regulatory barriers in place for transatlantic air
services, more commercial opportunities are created, including
those allowing airlines to restructure and adapt to dynamic in-
dustry changes. In addition, LCCs may expand their networks or
adjust their business models to take advantage of new possibili-
ties, such as the right to operate transatlantic services from any
EU city to any U.S. city. Investment in a long-haul fleet may now
be more financially attractive because carriers are no longer lim-
ited to non-stop operations from a single Member State. The full
effects of the EU-U.S. Agreement, however, cannot yet be
assessed.150
These comments raise serious questions about the merits of
any studies using pre-2007 data to analyze the effects of ATI for
transatlantic joint ventures on fares and frequencies. Many of
Brueckner’s studies used pre-2007 data. However, in a more re-
cent study, Brueckner claims that his earlier findings still hold,
albeit the positive effects are somewhat weaker:151
complementary service, gateway-to-gateway markets were elimi-
nated. The second category is gateway-to-beyond routes. These are
routes between a U.S. gateway airport and a non-gateway foreign
airport. A foreign carrier can offer online service on these routes,
but a U.S. carrier can only offer service by interlining with a foreign
carrier. These routes were also eliminated. Only U.S. carriers file
data with DOT, reporting their online service as well as interline
service they provide jointly with a foreign carrier. Because foreign
carriers can serve gateway-to-beyond routes on an online basis, this
online service will not appear in the data and could bias the results
of the estimation.
Id. at 12. It is interesting to note the routes that were excluded from the empiri-
cal analysis.
150 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 13.
151 Brueckner was responding to studies such as Gillespie & Richard’s Antitrust
Immunity Grants to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alli-
ances. Gillespie and Richard concluded:
The evidence shows that a grant of antitrust immunity to two com-
peting non-stop carriers in a trans-Atlantic route has a fare effect
that is equivalent to the loss of an independent competitor, and
fares are significantly higher in routes with fewer independent com-
petitors. This finding supports the normal antitrust presumption
that eliminating or substantially reducing competition through col-
laboration or merger enhances the market power of the remaining
suppliers and leads to higher prices, harming consumers. An anti-
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Recently, the previous empirical results on alliances have been
challenged in work carried out as part of regulatory proceedings.
The US Department of Justice (DOJ), in two studies produced as
part of its review of expanded ATI for the Star Alliance and the
subsequent AA/BA/IB antitrust-immunity case, argued that the
beneficial effects of alliance cooperation on interline fares is no
longer present. Instead of finding that ATI reduces interline
fares, putting them close to online fares, the DOJ studies argue
that lower alliance fares can be achieved without ATI . . . .
The notion that alliances generate fare benefits for interline pas-
sengers, coupled with actual dollar measures of these benefits,
has played a prominent role in regulatory actions on alliances,
both in the US and in Europe. But the recent controversy over
whether such benefits even exist calls these findings into ques-
tion, while casting a shadow over ATI approvals in previous cases.
. . . .
Table 1 summarizes the estimated fare effects from our regres-
sion model relative to the non-alliance interline base case. To
understand how to read the table, consider the column 1, which
shows the results for the full US-World sample, focusing on all
passengers (economy plus business class). The first number in
the column shows that the fare for a non-alliance CODESHARE
itinerary is 3.6% cheaper than the traditional interline fare. The
second number shows that the fare for an ALLIANCE itinerary
that does not involve either codesharing or ATI is 2.7% cheaper
than the traditional interline fare. The sum of these two numbers
then gives the fare reduction for an alliance itinerary that in-
volves codesharing, but where ATI is absent, a reduction equal to
3.6% + 2.7% = 6.3%. If ATI is added to any alliance itinerary, the
fare goes down by a further 4.9%. Thus, the fare for an immu-
nized alliance itinerary that involves codesharing is lower than
the traditional interline fare by the sum of all three numbers.
The fare reduction is thus 3.6% + 2.7% + 4.9%, or 11.2%, a num-
ber that is listed in the “full cooperation” row of the table. While
trust immunized JV also is not a merger, and the data indicate that
immunized JV participants do not achieve the pricing efficiencies
associated with unified control. The evidence further shows that,
within the major alliances, antitrust immunized arrangements do
not allow the JV partners to reduce fares for connecting trans-At-
lantic passengers below those sold under non-immunized arrange-
ments. This evidence undermines Applicants’ claims that antitrust
immunity is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of pric-
ing efficiencies in airline JVs. Accordingly, given the clear benefits
of competition in terms of lower prices for consumers, regulators
should be wary of calls to further decrease competition in interna-
tional aviation in pursuit of increasingly uncertain benefits.
Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants, supra note 22, at 1–2.
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full cooperation therefore yields a large reduction in the inter-
line fare, the reduction is not quite as large as the one associated
with online (single-carrier) service. The ONLINE number in the
first column shows that the online fare is 14.4% lower than the
traditional interline fare . . . .
These findings mirror the results from earlier research by show-
ing that successive increments to airline cooperation each reduce
the fare relative to the traditional interline level.
. . . .
Two broad policy conclusions can be drawn from our study. First,
unlike the recent puzzling findings from the DOJ studies, which
cast doubt on the view that airline cooperation leads to lower
interline fares, our study confirms what previous studies had
found using the most up-to-date data. Importantly, our findings
show that ATI, which gives alliance partners license to fully coop-
erate, leads to an incremental fare reduction for all types of pas-
sengers (economy and business and across all regions).152
There are several problems with Brueckner’s findings. Assum-
ing that ATI did lead to lower fares on certain routes, this does
not automatically imply that ATI was necessary. Further, were
immunized joint ventures able to offer lower fares because of
operational efficiencies that reduced their costs? In light of the
discussions above, it is unlikely that ATI did enable the joint ven-
tures to reduce their operating costs. This raises the possibility
that the lower fares reflected the strategy to drive non-alliance
competitors out of certain markets. In other words, Brueckner
cannot tell us whether ATI permitted joint ventures to engage in
predation.153 Finally, if ATI allowed joint ventures to offer pas-
sengers a more attractive service—one of the key arguments in
support of granting ATI and encouraging metal neutrality—why
did they not increase fares instead? Surely, passengers would
have been willing to pay a premium for better service.
Authors Gillespie and Richard have summarized the academic
and legal debate quite well:
To support their claim that antitrust immunized alliances benefit
consumers, Applicants cite evidence in the economics literature
that shows that consumers pay significantly lower fares for con-
necting flights offered through antitrust immunized alliance ar-
rangements rather than non-immunized alliance and interline
arrangements. In particular, they cite a fare study using 1999
152 Brueckner et al., Revisiting Alliances, Codesharing, Antitrust Immunity and In-
ternational Airfares, supra note 120, at 2–4.
153 See generally id.
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data by Brueckner (2003), which shows that, controlling for
route and travel itinerary characteristics, fares paid by connect-
ing passengers for flights offered by carriers in immunized alli-
ances were 8% to 10% lower than for flights offered by non-
immunized alliances, and 17% to 20% lower than for flights of-
fered through interline arrangements . . . . The authors (see also
Brueckner and Whalen 2000) argue that their results are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that carriers in an immunized alliance
charge lower fares to connecting passengers because they inter-
nalize a double marginalization problem that arises from the un-
coordinated choice of fares in the absence of immunity . . . .
Since the 1990s, however, as DOT has highlighted, the competi-
tive structure of the global airline industry has changed “in un-
precedented ways through mergers, financial restructurings, and
additional forms of cooperative agreements.” Findings for the
1990s, which were the formation years of alliances, may not apply
nowadays. Recent published work also cast doubt on the claim
that antitrust immunity is needed to reduce a double marginal-
ization problem in connecting fares. Bilotkach (2005) provides a
theory framework that shows that immunity is not needed to de-
liver this benefit, and Bilotkach (2007) finds using 1999 data that
alliances with and without antitrust immunity have equivalent
prices for economy-class connecting tickets. Likewise, though
Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2010) state that their results using
1998-2009 data mostly confirm findings in the literature that anti-
trust immunity by itself reduces connecting fares for trans-Atlan-
tic passengers, they actually find little, if any, fare effect from
immunity for economy-class tickets, which represent 95% of all
tickets sold to passengers in their data.154
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the empirical work is
inconclusive and incomplete. But the theoretical work that un-
derlies the empirical work is based on flawed assumptions and
weak theories. The theoretical work largely ignores the role and
importance of market foreclosure and other restrictive trade
practices.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. NEED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ATI
ATI never made sense, even for public policy purposes. Alli-
ances and ATI did not spare the major U.S. airlines from bank-
ruptcy. Open Skies agreements likely would have become
common even without ATI.
154 Gillespie & Richard, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 131, at 13.
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Alliances and joint ventures are considered to be the airline
industry’s primary method for circumventing foreign ownership
restrictions. Without such restrictions, supporters of joint ven-
tures and ATI believe that cross-border mergers would have
been commonplace. Mergers often turn out to be failures. Con-
sequently, it is unlikely that mergers would have improved the
competitive position of the acquiring airline. Moreover, distinct
differences in culture, government policies, and massive egos
likely would have prevented mergers between the leading com-
panies in each alliance.
The efficiency benefits of joint ventures and the goal of ATI to
encourage metal neutrality were unlikely to materialize. The
regulators never really thought through the integration
problems and how to overcome competing goals and different
corporate cultures. Hence, whatever efficiency gains were pro-
duced, they were unlikely to come close to offsetting the anti-
competitive effects.
In examining the potential anti-competitive impacts, regula-
tors did not fully appreciate the potential for restrictive trade
practices—market foreclosure, switching costs, access at hubs
(slots, gates, check-in counters)—and the possibility of lessening
competition in markets beyond the countries or continents cov-
ered by the ATI. For example, ATI for the transatlantic market
ignored the possibility that as an alliance accepted new mem-
bers, competition could be lessened on other routes, such as
North America to Africa, or any other country with a single air-
line that joined one of the alliances.
As discussed above, the EC and DOT did note the potential
for market foreclosure.155 But even though they acknowledged
this possibility, it did not appear to influence their decisions,
largely because no evidence would have been available at the
time of the proposed joint venture. Evidence would only be-
come available after a number of years during which the joint
venture would be operational, and their competitive behavior
could have been observed. Time limits for ATI and periodic re-
views appear to be warranted.
More recently, Diana Moss has pointed out the increasing
likelihood for market foreclosure:
This white paper examines the implications of this issue for U.S.
consumers. It focuses particularly on the implications of antitrust
immunity for U.S. consumers that travel on nonstop and con-
155 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 13.
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necting international itineraries that utilize U.S. alliance gate-
ways (i.e., hubs). Many of these gateways have become
significantly more concentrated as the result of sweeping U.S. air-
line consolidation over the past decade, raising concerns about
foreclosure of smaller, non-allied carriers and higher fares, less
choice in carriers, and lower quality for consumers. Such
changes undercut claims that immunity can bring substantial
benefits to consumers in nonstop and in the behind-the-gateway
and beyond-the-gateway markets served by the alliances.156
Her recommendations for future policy were:
• DOT’s policy on ATI should be more proactive in respond-
ing to fundamental competitive changes in U.S. markets
by including and enforcing sunset provisions.
• In light of increased concentration at U.S. alliance hubs,
DOT should look skeptically at arguments that immunity
creates benefits for consumers in behind-the-gateway and
beyond-the-gateway markets.
• DOT should conduct periodic reviews of grants of immu-
nity, per the standard 5-year requirement that is written
into almost every final ATI order.
• Ease of market entry (or lack thereof) by non-alliance car-
riers should be one of the DOT’s top considerations in re-
viewing existing and prospective grants of immunity.
• The DOT should routinely reject arguments that alliances
require immunity because they need to compete in the “al-
liance market.”157
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The general arguments supporting the creation of alliances
and joint ventures are that airlines were able to get around the
regulations that prevented mergers and the creation of subsidi-
aries in other countries, and that “seamless” travel could gener-
ate significant benefits for consumers. However, the two primary
reasons were more likely capacity control (the industry was sus-
ceptible to capacity wars that destroyed profitability) and market
dominance, especially on many international routes where there
was only one national carrier in a market.
The supposed benefits of alliances for consumers likely have
been overstated. But what should governments do now? The EC
156 Moss, supra note 135, at 2.
157 Id.
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and DOT have warned that governments might have few de-
grees of freedom to undo the ATI:
The Commission and DOT agree that one of the main chal-
lenges in the airline industry is to design a remedy that can effec-
tively address the identified negative effects of the parties’
cooperation while giving consideration to the principle of pro-
portionality. Given the specificities of the airline industry, it is,
however, difficult to apply the traditional forms of divesture rem-
edy, commonly used in other sectors. A key issue is the assess-
ment of the barriers to entry on the route(s) of concern: is it
possible to design remedies which would lower these barriers
such that entry on the route would become likely? Are there car-
riers whose existing networks would be compatible with potential
entry on a city-pair of concern, with appropriate remedies?158
Despite this warning, the author puts forward some suggestions.
1. Mandatory Interlining
Feed traffic, especially at major hub airports, is critical to sup-
port many routes to and from these hubs. If there is no technol-
ogy or any other real operational issue that prevents interlining,
or code-sharing between an alliance airline and a non-alliance
airline, then alliance airlines should be required to offer non-
alliance airlines the option to interline or code-share on terms
similar to those offered to alliance members. Otherwise, refusal
to offer interline or code-share could be a restrictive trade prac-
tice, and it would be subject to review by the FTC and DOJ in
the United States.
2. Open Access to Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP)
Frequent flyer programs were created by American Airlines to
promote loyalty, especially among the frequent travelers, and
create a switching cost for such travelers.159 At the present time
it is not the accumulation of points for redemption for free
travel that matters for frequent travelers.160 Rather, it is the ac-
cumulation of miles to achieve higher levels of status that offer
important perks.161 When someone joins a program, he or she is
reluctant to shop around to find lower prices on other, non-
affiliated airlines.
158 TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES, supra note 30, at 24.
159 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 37, at 18.
160 See id.
161 See id.
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The combination of FFP and dominance at a hub tend to re-
inforce each other in reducing the likelihood that frequent trav-
elers will switch to competing airlines. The switching costs deter
entry, and if the airline refuses to interline with a competitor,
competition is greatly lessened, especially in markets where feed
traffic is critical.
Thus, to level the playing field further, alliance airlines should
be required to open up their FFP to all passengers, even passen-
gers not flying on their respective airlines. Obviously, this might
lead to privacy and other competitive concerns. An alliance air-
line might use the information to contact passengers directly
and offer special deals to attract them away from other competi-
tors. But, undoubtedly, there are rules that could be imposed to
restrict this type of predatory behavior. There is a precedent for
this recommendation. The OECD pointed out the case in
Sweden:
A rare example of antitrust enforcement against an airline’s FFP
is provided by the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA). The
SCA found SAS liable for abusing its dominant position by ex-
tending its EuroBonus programme to domestic flights. SAS had a
market share of approximately 70% in the Swedish market for
scheduled domestic passenger flights. The SCA concluded that
EuroBonus programme had strong loyalty-inducing benefits
hampering competition from alternative carriers. On appeal, the
Swedish Market Court considered that the programme was capa-
ble of distorting market incentives, especially when the person
accruing the benefits (i.e. the employees) was not the one paying
for the programme (i.e. the employer). The Court also found
that EuroBonus programme could be used to influence prices by
reducing customers’ responsiveness to price, and that the pro-
gramme had a price-raising effect. The Market Court therefore
confirmed the SCA’s finding that SAS’s programme had exclu-
sionary effects. It prohibited the EuroBonus programme on do-
mestic routes where SAS or any airline cooperating with SAS
faced competition, as well as on routes considered by new
entrants.162
3. Competitive Pricing by Suppliers
Scale does give a company a bargaining advantage with suppli-
ers. If there are economies of scale and/or significant con-
tracting costs (including monitoring and enforcement), lower
prices might be warranted for large customers. However, the
162 Id. at 45–46.
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bargaining leverage can place smaller competitors at an increas-
ing disadvantage.
For this reason, it is important to continually monitor the rela-
tionships between suppliers of various services to airlines, partic-
ularly services at airports, to ensure that a dominant airline is
not pressuring a supplier to provide inferior service to competi-
tors. This might include longer wait times for ground handling
or fueling services, limited access to check-in counters, access
only to more remote gates, or access to less desirable slots. The
relationships must be monitored to ensure that suppliers are
not engaging in price discrimination that favors the larger
airline.
4. Time limits for ATI
The author concurs with Diana Moss’s recommendation that
the DOT include and enforce sunset provisions in all ATI
cases.163 And the DOT, in conjunction with the Department of
Justice and possibly the FTC, should conduct periodic reviews of
grants of immunity. The recent Delta-Aeromexico joint venture
has been granted ATI for five years.164 All the other existing im-
munized joint ventures should be subject to a similar five-year
time limit going forward. During the five-year period and at the
end of this period, the DOT should review each case to deter-
mine whether efficiencies did materialize and, if so, the magni-
tude of the efficiencies. They should also analyze the anti-
competitive effects, including the possibility of market foreclo-
sure through restrictive trade practices.
C. WRAP-UP
There never was a reason to grant ATI to any of the alliances,
except for the per se rule in the United States. Collaboration
through a joint venture either was going to produce operational
efficiencies with subsequently lower fares and a higher quality of
service, in which case ATI was not required, or was going to sig-
nificantly lessen competition, in which case ATI could not be
supported by the competition laws.
When the requests for ATI were made, it should have been
clear that improvements in operational efficiency would be lim-
ited at best. Different ownership structures, objectives, corpo-
rate cultures, incompatible IT systems, and egos would stand in
163 Moss, supra note 135, at 2.
164 Id. at 11.
2018] ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 837
the way, as they did. In assessing the potential for lessening com-
petition, the regulators, particularly the DOT, did not fully con-
sider the potential for the implementation of various restrictive
trade practices by the alliances or the possibility of monopoliza-
tion of routes beyond the countries involved in the ATI applica-
tions. Carve outs were a weak compromise for minimizing the
anti-competitive impacts of immunized joint ventures. They did
not address other foreclosure strategies, predation, or the mo-
nopolization of third country markets.
While the recommendations the author has suggested do not
guarantee that competition will flourish in many international
markets, they are critical to creating a more level playing field.
For a similar reason, the inclusion of subsidy and dumping
codes in Open Skies Agreement are warranted to maintain as a
level a playing field as possible in international markets.165 With
a level playing field, the companies with the superior strategies
and the best execution of their strategies will succeed over time.
165 Fred Lazar, Multilateral Trade Agreements for Civil Aviation, 36 AIR & SPACE L.
379, 384 (2011).
